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Résumé 
 
Il  est  usuellement  admis  que  les  deux  composantes  des  taux  d’intérêt  nominaux,  selon 
l’approche proposée par Fisher – le taux réel et l’inflation –, évoluent de façon autonome, 
leurs déterminants n’étant pas les mêmes. Cependant, l’évaluation de ces deux composantes à 
partir  d’instruments  financiers  récemment  introduits  sur  les  marchés  ne  fournit  pas 
d’enseignements  clairs.  L’analyse  des  évolutions  des  taux  nominaux  et  réels  (indexés  sur 
l’inflation) dans les grandes zones économiques amène à observer i) que l’écart entre ces deux 
taux (le point mort d’inflation) et les taux réels sont positivement corrélés entre les différents 
pays ;  ii)  mais  que  cette  corrélation  devient  négative  en  cas  de  certaines  distorsions 
importantes.  La  corrélation  est  proche  de  zéro  pour  chaque  pays  tant  que  ces  distorsions 
demeurent nationales ; elle devient négative quand ces distorsions sont généralisées, comme à 
certains moments de la crise actuelle. La présente étude propose une approche internationale 
permettant de distinguer les composantes idiosyncratiques de ces corrélations de celles plus 
générales qui ont été affectées dans le contexte de la crise actuelle.  
 
Mots-clés : Obligation  indexées sur l’inflation ; point mort d’inflation ; hypothèse de Fisher 








It is generally assumed that the two Fisher components of the interest rate -the real interest 
and  the  inflation-  evolve  independently  over  time,  considering  that  they  are  driven  by 
unrelated economical events. However, the market pricing of those components deduced from 
newly-available bond data does not provide conclusive evidence. While studying the price 
behaviour of inflation-linked (real) bonds beside nominal bonds in the major fixed-income 
markets,  we  observe  that  the  real  bond  yields  and  the  yield  differentials,  the  breakeven 
inflation rates, have the propensity to be positively correlated between each other across the 
various countries, yet are pushed into a negative correlation relationship due to market-related 
price distortions. As long as those distortions are local, the net result is near-zero correlation 
within countries; when they become global, as in the heat of the current crisis, the correlations 
turn negative worldwide. In this paper insight is gained by taking an innovative worldwide 
study approach and thanks to revealing crisis period events. 
 
Key words: inflation-linked bonds, breakeven inflation, Fisher hypothesis 
JEL classification: E43, G15 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The yield of an inflation-linked bond, informally called the real bond yield (RBY), 
reflects  the  market  pricing  of  the  long-term  real  interest  rate  in  the  same  manner  as  the 
nominal bond yields (NBY) ‘price’ the nominal interest rate. The relatively recent issuance of 
inflation-protected securities by governments around the world has made it possible, for the 
first  time
1,  to  pair  up  the  two  bond  types  and  observe  the  yield  differentials,  called  the 
breakeven inflation rates (BEIR). The longstanding idea of decomposing interest rates into 
two components, introduced by Irving Fisher in his seminal book named Theory of Interest 
(1930), can eventually be tried now the new bond markets are maturing and becoming more 
liquid. 
Fisher had hypothesized that the two components should be unrelated to one another: 
“… the real interest rate is entirely determined by the real factors in an economy, i.e. the 
productivity of capital and the investors’ time preference, and should thus be unrelated to the 
inflation expectation.” Many efforts have been undertaken to provide empirical evidence; see 
Cooray (2002) for a literature review. In Cette and de Jong (2008), we had made a renewed 
attempt with tests on recent bond market data, observing that the Fisher hypothesis seems to 
hold country per country  yet is definitely rejected in an international context. Tests were 
based on a historical correlation matrix measured between the two interest rate components, 
BEIR  and  RBY,  across  various  countries,  featuring  near  zeros  (more  exactly, 
unsystematically negative, nil or positive numbers) on the diagonal, i.e. within countries, and 
strictly positive numbers elsewhere, i.e. between countries.  
By means of standard statistical analysis, by which worldwide common bond yield 
movements are separated from idiosyncratic movements within countries, we had succeeded 
in disentangling two effects in the correlation structure. The schema is given in Figure 1 
below.  The  complete  matrix,  displayed  in  (a),  turns  out  to  be  the  net  sum  of  a  positive 
common global correlation (b) and a negative idiosyncratic country-specific correlation (c). 
The diagonal terms in (a) are the sum of a positive term (from matrix (b)) and a negative term 
(from matrix (c)), and can consequently be nil, negative or positive. 
 
                                                 
1 The scale in which such bonds are being issued is new, not the concept. According to Shiller (2003) the first 
inflation indexed bonds were issued by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in 1780 during the Revolutionary 
war to deal with severe wartime inflation.   4 
Figure 1  
Schematic decomposition of the correlation matrix between BEIR and RBY variation across countries 
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The finding is puzzling. The correlation structure, untypical for bonds  and casting 
doubt on the Fisher hypothesis, pulls all analyses traditionally made in a national perspective 
into scrutiny. 
In our previous article we had shown the correlation structure to be stable over time up 
to mid-2008. In this article we study what happened after, in the current financial crisis, up to 
mid-2010, during which bonds have been in great turmoil, as documented by many such as 
Campbell  et  al.  (2009).  Our  main  findings  are  the  following.  While  the  idiosyncratic 
correlation  structure  remained  unchanged  in  the  turmoil,  the  common  correlation  became 
negative,  resulting  in  a  negative  correlation  matrix  overall  with  significantly  negative 
coefficients on the diagonal. We explain this change by a worldwide lack of liquidity in the 
real bond markets affecting the prices, and we observe that, as soon as this simultaneous 
liquidity problem resolved in 2009, the bond prices settle back into the same regime as given 
in  Figure  1.  Our  international  study  approach  remains  original  in  the  literature  to  our 
knowledge, many other articles focusing on national indexed bond markets only. It proves 
essential in gaining insight in the effects behind the interest rate component movements. 
Section  2  discusses  the  data  issues,  section  3  and  4  give  an  analysis  of  the  bond 
correlations respectively before and since the crisis, and section 5 concludes.   
 
 
2.  Data issues 
   
The  data  has  been  retrieved  from  Barclays  Capital.  Developed  countries  issuing 
inflation-linked bonds since at least a decade have been retained.
2 It covers the Inflation-
Linked Gilts issued in the United Kingdom, the Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) 
in the United States, les Obligations Assimilables du Trésor indexées sur l’inflation (OATi) in 
                                                 
2 Japan has not been retained for this reason. 5 
the Euro Area, the Treasury Indexed Bonds in Australia, the Index-Linked Treasury Bonds in 
Sweden and the Real Return Bonds in Canada. Generic bond yields have been calculated by 
Barclays  Capital  per  interval  of  maturity  dates.  The  seven-to-ten-year  term-to-maturity 
interval with a bond-duration close to 7.5 years has been selected for this study, since it is by 
and large the most liquid category. We refer to Barclays’ Global Inflation-Linked Products 
edited by James (2010) for more details on their calculus.  
The observation period, from mid-2002 to mid-2010 has been divided in three in order 
to  separate  out  the  period  of  great  market  turbulence  in  2008-2009.  There  is  a  pre-crisis 
period, from July 2002 to September 2008, a turbulent period, from October 2008 to May 
2009, and a post-turbulent period, from June 2009 to June 2010. In order to set the cut-off 
dates we have measured market turbulence by means of the standard deviation of the weekly 
variation in the breakeven inflation rates over four weeks and over all countries in the dataset. 
If this measure exceeds two times its historical average, the market is deemed turbulent. 
 
 
3.  The bond correlation structure before the financial crisis 
 
The correlation matrix measured in Cette and de Jong (2008) between the major bond 
markets over a six-year period from 2002 to 2008 is reprinted in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Correlation matrix between breakeven inflation variation and real bond yield variation across countries 
Period: July 2002 to September 2008 – Weekly data frequency.
3 
Data source: Barclays Capital. Correlation measures made by the authors. 
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Euro Area  0.18
***  0.04  -0.11
**  0.05  0.15
**  0.11
** 
Great Britain  0.15












United States  0.21
***  0.02  0.10
*  0.13
***  0.15
***  -0.07 
***: significant at the 1% level (critical value at 0.13); 
**: significant at the 5% level (critical value at 0.11); 
*: significant at the 10% level (critical value at 0.09) - Using an asymptotic T-test with T=325. 
 
A dual phenomenon can be observed. The correlations are nil, or more precisely they 
are  unsystematically  negative,  nil  or  positive,  as  discussed  in  the  introduction,  within 
countries (on the diagonal), while in contrast they are strictly positive between countries (the 
cross  terms).  This  is  puzzling.  In  practical  terms,  it  means  that  the  yield  variation  of  an 
                                                 
3 On a monthly data frequency results are very similar. 6 
American TIPS, to take an example, is uncorrelated with the breakeven inflation movements 
in the US (bottom right number in the matrix). It indicates that the bond price is insensitive to 
inflation concerns, which is in effect the raison d’être of the security. Yet why would its yield 
correlate  with  breakeven  movements  registered  in  other  countries  (the  numbers  in  the 
rightmost column)? The correlations do not strike with theory either. The Fisher hypothesis 
seems to hold within countries –in effect a joint test of zero correlation is not rejected even on 
a 10 % error level-, however it is rejected, on a 1 % significance level, across countries. 
An  explanation  can  be  given  on  the  basis  of  an  elementary  matrix  decomposition 
analysis. The movements of the breakeven inflation and real bond yields are decomposed into 
a common- and an idiosyncratic component per country. The common component of each 
variable  is  extracted  through  a  regression  across  countries  with  time-fixed  effects  as 
explanatory variables; the idiosyncratic component is for each variable the residual of this 
regression. Ignoring the (small) cross terms and ignoring that correlations don’t exactly add, it 
results, as shown in the schema in Figure 1, that the total correlation, displayed in Table 1, 
turns out to be the net sum of two distinct effects
4:  
(i)  The common global component of the BEIRs tends to move in the same direction as 
the  common  global  component  of  the  RBYs,  resulting  in  a  positive  common 
correlation matrix; 
(ii)  The idiosyncratic country-specific component of the BEIRs tends to move against the 
idiosyncratic components of the RBYs within the same country, yet have no statistical 
relation  with  those  of  other  countries,  resulting  in  a  diagonal  negative  correlation 
matrix. 
We interpret the two effects separately. The negative idiosyncratic correlation can be 
directly associated with certain time-varying market distortions that are being mentioned in 
the literature; see Christensen et al. (2004) for a survey. As soon as the real bond price moves 
due to such country-specific market-related events, which are typically not mirrored in the 
nominal  bond  price,  the  breakeven  rate  mechanically  moves  in  opposite  direction.  Those 
events  appear  to  be  sufficiently  recurrent  to  provoke  a  systematic  idiosyncratic  negative 
correlation  over  time.  Our  observation  complements  the  literature  that  analyses  a  price 
premium on real bonds relative to nominal bonds resulting from those market distortions. 
Abrupt market liquidity problems are mentioned to be the main cause of the price 
distortions, for example by Craig (2003), Sack and Elsasser (2004), Shen (2006), D’Amico et 
                                                 
4 The detailed decomposition is available upon request from the authors.  7 
al. (2009), Campbell et al., (2009) as well as  Gürkaynak  et al. (2010). Gürkaynak  et al. 
(2010) relate the liquidity premium, which is being observed in the inflation-linked bond 
prices  compared  to  the  nominal  bond  prices,  to  the  particularly  low  trading  volumes  for 
inflation-linked  bonds.
5  They  explain  in  a  regression  analysis  the  time-variability  of  the 
liquidity premium on TIPS directly by the variations in the TIPS trading volumes. These 
market-related  events  being  usually  country  specific,  explain  the  idiosyncratic  negative 
correlation between the BEIR and RBY.  
Others  observe  a  risk  premium  rather,  which  varies  depending  on  the  aversion  to 
inflation uncertainty among the market participants; see Hördahl and Tristani (2007) on Euro 
Area data, Emmons (2000), on US data, Evans (1998), on US and UK data, and Côté et al. 
(1996), on Canadian data. Ejsing et al. (2007) show that the seasonality in consumer prices 
over the year adds to the price discrepancy as well. Note that those price influences are also 
mainly idiosyncratic. 
The positive correlation between the global BEIR and RBY is less commented in the 
literature, since it is not easily observable on a national level. In fact, market practitioners do 
recognise its existence indirectly when they mention the beta effect (see Pond, 2008). It is the 
observation that the RBY tends to move in the same direction as the NBY yet in smaller 
amplitude. Note that in that situation, the BEIR mechanically moves in the same direction as 
well, resulting in positive correlation. The market phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 2 on a 
global scale. The weekly global RBY variation is set out on the Y-axis against the global 
NBY variation in the same week on the X-axis. The dots cover the off-crisis weeks and the 
triangles the crisis-period weeks. Note the R-squared of the regression line through the off-
crisis observations being significantly high. 
Does this market observation match with usual macroeconomic theory? In theory the 
nominal and real interest rates should move together with the same amplitude after a shock 
that has no significant impact on inflation expectations (for example, at the first order, a 
technological shock). Or otherwise, the nominal interest rate should move alone after a pure 
inflation shock. Notice in Figure 2 that those events rarely occur in practice. The fact that 
most of the time the net result of the two scenarios is observed means that the two types of 
shock  very  often  coincide  or  that  somehow  bond  prices  absorb  the  two  types  of  shock 
simultaneously.  
                                                 
5 Gürkaynak et al. (2010) report that in the US, the TIPS market expressed as a share of total Treasury trading 
represented about 0.5% in 1999 and 2% in 2006. 8 
Figure 2 
The beta effect between global nominal- and real bond yield movements 
Period: July 2002 to June 2010 
·: Weekly NBY and RBY variations registered from 07/2002 to 09/2008 and from 06/2009 to 06/2010 
D: Weekly NBY and RBY variations registered from 10/2008 to 05/2009, in the heat of the crisis 
Data source: Barclays Capital. Calculations made by the authors. 
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4. Bond market experience since the financial crisis 
 
We investigate what happened during the current crisis period. The correlation matrix 
between  breakeven  inflation  and  real  bonds  measured  between  September  2008  and  May 
2009 is given in Table 2. Over this period, the correlations are (i) strongly negative within 
countries (on the diagonal), and (ii) weakly negative between countries (the cross terms). The 
test of zero correlation is integrally rejected on a 1% significance level. Despite the admittedly 
reduced reliability of the tests in non-stationary times, it may be concluded that the Fisher 
hypothesis does not hold, even within countries. 
 9 
Table 2 
Correlation matrix between breakeven inflation variation and real bond yield variation across countries 
Period: October 2008 to May 2009 – Weekly data frequency. 
Data source: Barclays Capital. Calculations made by the authors. 
  RBY  







Australia  -0.21  -0.31
*  -0.08  -0.23  -0.21  -0.22 
Canada   0.12  -0.62
***   0.19  -0.26   0.23  -0.34
** 
Euro Area   0.04  -0.04  -0.70
***  -0.38
**   0.07   0.03 
Great Britain  -0.11  -0.40
***  -0.28
*  -0.68
***   0.20  -0.33
** 
Sweden  0.22  -0.01   0.06   0.06  -0.32
*   0.06 
United States  0.26  -0.38
**   0.13  -0.12   0.18  -0.59
*** 
***: significant at the 1% level (critical value at 0.39); 
**: significant at the 5% level (critical value at 0.33); 
*: significant at the 10% level (critical value at 0.28) - Using an asymptotic T-test with T=35. 
 
The  same  elementary  matrix  decomposition  produces  the  schema  as  displayed  in 
Figure 3.
6 Note that the sole difference with the pre-crisis period lies in (b): the correlation 
between the common global BEIR and RBY movements turns negative. The sign change is 
informative. It is, to us, caused by the same issues of liquidity and risk attitude mentioned 
above.  The  worldwide  market  distortions  have  provoked  a  negative  common  correlation 
between the BEIR and the RBY, in the same way as they do on a national scale in normal 
times. In the heat of the crisis, the inflation-linked bond markets contracted in all countries 
simultaneously. Considering the relatively small trading volumes on these markets, the price 
shocks the inflation-linked bonds incurred provoked a negative correlation with the breakeven 
inflation rates in all countries. Any global price shock in the real bonds that is typically not 
registered in the nominal bond markets leads to a mechanic opposite movement in the global 
breakeven inflation. 
 
Figure 3  
Schematic decomposition of the correlation matrix in Table 2 
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(a)   (b)  (c) 
 
This interpretation fits in with the finance literature reporting on the crisis events: 
there was a massive flight to liquidity. James (2010) wrote: “the extreme deleveraging phase 
that engulfed almost all financial markets included the majority of off-benchmark investors in 
                                                 
6 The complete decomposition is omitted but can be obtained from the authors upon request. 10 
inflation-linked  bonds  being  stopped  out  of  their  positions”.  The  bankruptcy  of  Lehman 
Brothers added to the turmoil for it was the world leader on inflation-secured instruments (see 
Hu and Worah, 2009, or Bekaert and Wang, 2010). Simultaneously in the economic literature, 
the near-meltdown of the financial sector was seen as the start of an extended low-growth 
period,  with  lower  inflation  than  expected  before  the  crisis.  The  relevance  of  inflation 
issuance  by  inflation-linked  bonds  decreased,  reducing  its  demand.  The  price  fall  of 
commodities -in particular petrol- was reinforcing this view.  
The flight to the mature nominal bond markets, which penalized TIPS demand and 
increased their risk premium in 2008, as show Gürkaynak, Sack and  Wright (2010), was 
worldwide,  its  factors  being  themselves  worldwide,  as  mentioned  before.  It  is  shown  in 
Figure 4 that not only in the US, but in all developed world countries, the BEIR decreased 
dramatically from in the last quarter of 2008, to normalize after in the first half of 2009, back 
to pre-crisis levels. The abnormal BEIR levels in 2008 and 2009 stem from a decrease in the 
nominal rates as well as an increase in the real rates. These global co-movements, that are a 
good  illustration  of  the  generalized  flight-to-liquidity  behaviour,  explain  the  common 
negative co-movements of the BEIR and the RBY, which explain on its turn why the common 
































The 10-year breakeven inflation rates in the developed world 
Data source: Barclays Capital. 
Period: July 2002 to June 2010. 
 
 
From June 2009 when markets calmed down, the correlation matrix settled back into 
the same regime as before (see Table 3), and its decomposition matches with Figure 1. This 
shows, or gives strong indication, that the untypical correlation structure between BEIR and 
RBYs is nevertheless robust. 
 
Table 3 
Correlation matrix between breakeven inflation variation and real bond yield variation 
Period: June 2009 to June 2010 – Weekly data frequency. 
Data source: Barclays Capital. Calculations made by the authors. 
  RBY  








*  -0.06  0.37





***  0.19  0.23
*  0.49
***  0.19 
Euro Area  0.20
*  -0.07  -0.14  0.27
**  0.42
***  0.15 
Great Britain  0.25
*  -0.15  0.04  -0.31
**  0.16  0.04 
Sweden  0.36
***  0.08  0.44
***  0.50
***  0.24
**  0.17 
United States  0.40
***  0.10  0.48
***  0.42
***  0.54
***  -0.02 
***: significant at the 1% level (critical value at 0.31); 
**: significant at the 5% level (critical value at 0.26); 








  The events on the capital markets during the present crisis provide new insight in the 
price  covariance  structure  of  bonds.  The  two  components  of  the  nominal  bond  yield,  the 
breakeven inflation and the real bond yield, have the propensity to be positively correlated, 
yet are pushed into a negative correlation relationship by certain market events. As long as 
those market distortions are local, the net result is near-zero  correlation within countries; 
when they become global, as was the case in the heat of the crisis, the correlation between real 
bond yields and breakeven rates turns negative worldwide. Those empirical findings have 
been shown to be robust over the pre- and post-crisis period. 
  This untypical correlation behaviour has been left uncommented in the literature, the 
reason for that being that studies on inflation-linked bonds are traditionally made in a national 
context,  while  an  international  analysis  is  necessary  to  reveal  the  underlying  effects.  We 
consider the demonstration of the correlation relationships an important contribution to the 
finance  literature;  its  understanding  is  essential  in  bond  risk  analysis,  in  particular  in 
establishing the risk profile of fixed income portfolios. 
The results are a contribution to the economic literature as well, the more that they are 
not in line with conventional theory of Fisher (1930) postulating zero correlation between the 
two interest rate components. The discrepancy between macroeconomic theory and financial 
practice has been indirectly reported by central bankers, e.g. in Bernanke’s (2004) speech 
What Policymakers Can Learn from Asset Prices. The issuance of inflation-linked bonds had 
in part been motivated by the expectation that the observed breakeven inflation would in some 
way  reflect  the  credibility  granted  to  Central  Banks  regarding  their  control  on  inflation. 
Bernanke reckons the volatility of the breakeven inflation too high, to the extent that the 











Bernanke,  B.,  (2004):  “What  Policymakers  Can  Learn  from  Asset  Prices”,  The  Federal 
Reserve Board. 
 
Bekaert G. and X. Wang (2010): “Inflation risk and the inflation risk premium”, Economic 
Policy, 2010, pp. 755-806. 
 
Campbell, J. Y., R. J. Shiller and L. M. Viceira (2009): “Understanding Inflation-Indexed 
Bond Markets”, NBER Working Paper Series, n° 15014, May.  
 
Cette, G. and M. de Jong (2008): “The Rocky Ride of Breakeven Inflation Rates”, Economics 
Bulletin, Vol; 5, n° 30, pp. 1-8.  
 
Christensen, I., F. Dion and C. Reid (2004): “Real Return Bonds, Inflation Expectations and 
the Break Even Inflation Rate”, Bank of Canada Working Paper, 2004-43. 
 
Cooray, A., (2002): “The Fisher Effect: a Review of the Literature”, Research paper n° 206, 
department of economics, Macquarie University. 
 
Côté, A., J. Jacob, J. Nelmes and M. Whittingham (1996): “Inflation Expectations and Real 
Return Bonds”, Bank of Canada Review, Summer, pp. 41-53. 
 
Craig, B. (2003): “Why are TIIS Yields so High? The case of the Missing Inflation-Risk 
Premium”, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Economic Commentary. 
 
D’Amico S., D. H. Kim and M. Wei (2009): “Tips from TIPS: The informational content of 
Treasury Inflation-Protected Security prices”, mimeo, December, 29. 
 
Ejsing, J., J. A. Garcia and T. Werner (2007): “The Term Structure of Euro Area Break Even 
Inflation Rates”, European Central Bank, Working Paper Series, n° 830, November.  
 
Emmons, W. (2000): “The Information Content of Treasury Inflation-Indexed Securities”, 
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Review, November/December. 
 
Evans, M. (1998): “Real Rates, Expected Inflation and Inflation Risk Premia”, Journal of 
Finance, pp. 187-218. 
 
Gürkaynak, R. S., B. Sack and J. H. Wright (2010): “The TIPS Yield Curve and Inflation 
Compensation”, American Economic Journal, Macroeconomics, 2:1, pp. 70-92. 
 
Hördahl, P., and O. Tristani (2007): “Inflation risk premia in the term structure of interest 
rates”, BIS Working Papers, n° 228, May. 
 
Hu, G. and M. Worah (2009): “Why Tips Real Yields moved significantly higher after the 
Lehman Bankruptcy”, PIMCO, Newport Beach, CA. 
 
Hunter, D. and D. Simon (2005): “Are TIPS the ‘real’ deal? A conditional assessment of their 
role in a nominal portfolio”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 29 (2005), pp. 347-368.  
 14 
James,  A.  (2010):  “Global  Inflation-Linked  Products  –  A  User’s  Guide”,  Introduction,  in 
Barclays Capital Research, March, pp. 1-2.  
 
Pond,  M.  (2008):  “Effective  duration  of  linkers  and  beta”,  in  Barclays  Capital  Research: 
“Global Inflation-Linked Products”, February. 
 
Sack,  B. and R. Elsasser (2004): “Treasury  Inflation-Indexed Debt:  A  Review of the US 
Experience”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Economic Policy Review, May, pp. 47-63. 
 
Shen, P. (2006): “Liquidity Risk Premia and Breakeven Inflation Rates”, Economic Review, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Second Quarter, pp. 29-53.  
 
Shiller,  R.  (2003):  “The  invention  of  inflation-indexed  bonds  in  early  America”,  Cowles 
Foundation Discussion Paper, n° 1442, October.  
 
  
Documents de Travail 
 
 
350. V. Borgy, T. Laubach, J-S. Mésonnier and J-P. Renne, “Fiscal Sustainability, Default Risk and Euro Area 
Sovereign Bond Spreads,” October 2011 
351. C. Cantore, F. Ferroni and M. A. León-Ledesma, “Interpreting the Hours-Technology time-varying 
relationship,” November 2011 
352. A. Monfort and J.-P. Renne, “Credit and liquidity risks in euro-area sovereign yield curves,” November 2011 
353. H. Le Bihan and J. Matheron, “Price Stickiness and Sectoral Inflation Persistence: Additional Evidence,” 
November 2011 
354. L. Agnello, D. Furceri and R. M. Sousa, “Fiscal Policy Discretion, Private Spending, and Crisis Episodes,” 
December 2011 
355. F. Henriet, S. Hallegatte and L. Tabourier, “Firm-Network Characteristics and Economic Robustness to Natural 
Disasters,” December 2011 
356. R. Breton, “A smoke screen theory of financial intermediation,” December 2011 
357. F. Lambert, J. Ramos-Tallada and C. Rebillard, “Capital controls and spillover effects: evidence from Latin-
American countries,” December 2011 
358. J. de Sousa, T. Mayer and S. Zignago, “Market Access in Global and Regional Trade,” December 2011 
359. S. Dubecq and C. Gourieroux, “A Term Structure Model with Level Factor Cannot be Realistic and Arbitrage 
Free,” January 2012 
360. F. Bec, O. Bouabdallah and L. Ferrara, “The European way out of recessions,” January 2012 
361.  A. Banerjee, V. Bystrov and P. Mizen, “How do anticipated changes to short-term market rates influence 
banks' retail interest rates? Evidence from the four major euro area economies,” February 2012 
362. G. Corcos, D. Irac, G. Mion and T. Verdier, “The determinants of intrafirm trade: Evidence from French 
firms,” February 2012 
363. C. Glocker, and P. Towbin, “Reserve Requirements for Price and Financial Stability - When Are They 
Effective?,” February 2012 
364. C. Altomonte, F. Di Mauro, G. Ottaviano, A. Rungi and V. Vicard, “Global Value Chains during the Great 
Trade Collapse: A Bullwhip Effect?,” February 2012 
365. Ph. Andrade and M. Zachariadis, “Global versus local shocks in micro price dynamics,” February 2012 
366. G. Cette, V. Chouard et G. Verdugo, “Les effets des hausses du SMIC sur le salaire moyen,” Février 2012 









For a complete list of Working Papers published by the Banque de France, please visit the website: 
www.banque-france.fr 
 
Pour tous commentaires ou demandes sur les Documents de Travail, contacter la bibliothèque de la Direction Générale 
des Études et des Relations Internationales à l'adresse suivante : 
 
For any comment or enquiries on the Working Papers, contact the library of the Directorate General Economics and 
International Relations at the following address : 
 
    BANQUE DE FRANCE 
    49- 1404  Labolog 
    75049 Paris Cedex 01 
    tél : 0033 (0)1 42 97 77 24 ou 01 42 92 63 40 ou 48 90 ou 69 81 
   email  :  1404-ut@banque-france.fr 
 